Thucydides, son of Olorus, belonging to the noble family of the Philaidae (Alimus, 460 BC – Athens, 404 BC), was an Athenian historian and military commander, one of the principal exponents of Greek literature thanks to his historiographical masterpiece, The Peloponnesian War, which together with the work of Herodotus constitutes one of the fundamental sources from which modern historians have drawn in reconstructing many events of ancient Greek history, and for this reason he is considered by many to be the first historian of antiquity.
This accurate account of the great war between Athens and Sparta (431–404 BC) is regarded — in terms of its modernity — as one of the greatest narrative models of antiquity, certainly one of the earliest examples of the analysis of historical events according to the measure of human nature, thus excluding the intervention of any divinity.
A fervent supporter of the statesman Pericles, Thucydides held the office of strategos of the Athenian fleet during the war in the northern Aegean Sea.
Accused of treason for failing in the relief expedition during the Battle of Amphipolis, he left Athens and lived in exile in Thrace, where he spent twenty years.
During the long years of exile, Thucydides reorganized his writings, collecting them into his articulated work: a set of eight books composing The Peloponnesian War, a profound and analytical chronological account of the conflict that, between 431 BC and 404 BC, pitted the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta, against the Delian League, headed by Athens, the two greatest Greek powers, both competing for supremacy over the poleis of the Greek world across an area extending from Asia Minor to the colonies of Magna Graecia.
Book IV, particularly chapter 24, describes a significant episode of the intermediate phase of the Archidamian War (around 425 BC), focusing on military maneuvers in the Strait of Messina and on the attempt by the Syracusan fleet, allied with Sparta, to limit Athenian influence over this strategic maritime passage.
In this context, Thucydides then proceeds, with his customary strategic clarity and precision, to provide a geographical and topographical description of the Strait of Messina, highlighting the characteristics that help explain the determination of the warring parties to control this maritime passage, investing Scilla in particular with great military strategic value and linking it fully to one of the great military events of the ancient Mediterranean, an event destined to change the face of the Greek world.
“At this time in Sicily the Syracusans, together with their allies, reinforced with another naval contingent the squadron stationed as a garrison at Messene, concentrating there, as they were equipped, the new vessels and launching their military operations precisely from that sector. […] They intended to engage in a naval battle, seeing that the ships available to the Athenians in those waters were still few and because they had received information that the main Athenian fleet, expected at any moment, was instead detained by the siege of the island. If they succeeded in becoming masters of the sea battle, it would be easy for them to capture Rhegium with the combined forces of infantry and navy, and their military advantage would be greatly strengthened. For since the promontory of Rhegium, in Italy, is separated by only a very narrow stretch of sea from Messene in Sicily, it was thought that its conquest would prevent the Athenians from anchoring in and controlling the strait. The strait consists of the narrow passage of sea between Rhegium and Messene, where the space separating Sicily from the mainland is at its smallest. The place was called Scylla and Charybdis and it is said that Odysseus too passed through it with his ship. The narrowness of the channel, together with the fact that waters rush into it from two vast seas, the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Sicilian Sea, with the resulting formation of whirlpools and currents, fully justifies its reputation as a dangerous passage.”
The passage refers to the events of 425 BC, during the first Athenian expedition to Sicily, also known as the Leontini expedition.
At this stage of the conflict, while the main war opposed Athens and Sparta, the Sicilian theatre became a strategic arena of clashes and local rivalries.
The Syracusans, together with their Siceliot allies, concentrated their fleet at Messina, a city they already garrisoned, with the objective of countering the Athenian presence in Sicily.
The decision was also encouraged by the initiative of the Locrians of Locri Epizephyrii, driven by a deep and ancient hostility toward Rhegium. The Locrians urged Syracuse to undertake military action against Rhegium, having already attempted incursions into its territory, taking advantage of the favorable moment.
The Syracusans believed that the Athenian fleet present in Sicily was numerically weak, since the main part of Athens’ naval forces was engaged in the siege of Sphacteria in the Peloponnese.
ally of Athens) by land and sea, could strengthen their position and prevent the Athenians from controlling the Strait of Messina, the strategic junction between the Tyrrhenian and Sicilian seas, between Sicily and Italy.
Thucydides concludes the description by focusing on the Strait of Messina, the stretch of sea separating Italy from Sicily and the scene of the aforementioned military operations. He presents it as a particularly dangerous place because of the strong currents generated by the meeting of the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Sicilian Sea, emphasizing the strategic importance of the area.
In this context he also recalls the Homeric tradition associated with the myth, localized here, of Odysseus’ passage between Scylla and Charybdis; this passage highlights Thucydides’ “scientific” approach, as he rationalizes the Homeric myths (Scylla and Charybdis) by describing their real physical causes within the context of military conflict.
The presence of Scilla, understood as both a geographical and mythological element, serves to emphasize the difficulty of navigation through the strait and the strategic importance of controlling it.
Giuseppe Ribuffo
